Exploring Inequality in Pre-industrial Societies
As the knowledge about the last century's movements in within-country income inequality has reached a scholarly consensus,1 our lack of similar knowledge about evolution of income inequality in earlier time-periods has become more glaring. In light of the recent emphasis on the role of institutions, including inequality-generating institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Engerman et al> 2000; Acemoglu et al, 2001) , the lack of past data on income distribution places severe limitations on our ability to understand the roots of economic growth, arguably one of the most important questions in economics. A number of relevant questions can be asked in that respect: did currently developed countries acquire their early twentieth-century inequalities only after their Industrial Revolutions, or were their rich and poor residents just as far apart many centuries earlier? How does inequality in today's least developed, agricultural countries compare with that in agricultural societies dating back to the Roman Empire? Was inequality more or less stable over time in given societies?
Such questions have yet to be answered, for want of sufficient data. The chief objective of this article is to provide a fresh and, in most cases, the first set of inequality estimates for pre-industrial societies and to co with the modern ones. We define as pre-industria to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution (our the Napoleonic wars) and all other societies up to were obviously not times when countries conduc main source of income distribution data that we resort to less precise, but reasonable, sources of d few cases for this purpose: social tables where sal their estimated average incomes and populat processed such data from 28 pre-industrial socie Roman Empire to 1947 British-ruled India. Sectio concepts, the inequality possibility frontier and the relating actual inequalities to the maxima allow subsistence. Although the new concepts have gen useful for a study of inequality in relatively poor frontier and the inequality extraction ratio, both fresh interpretations of inequality in the very long in some detail, present estimates of income inequa 28 pre-industrial societies and apply the two conce in the article is, due to its size, available only as a present our conclusions.
The Inequality Possibility Frontier and th
The workhorse for our empirical analysis of early inequality possibility frontier. Suppose that each soci way as to guarantee subsistence minimum for its total income is the surplus that is shared amon income is very low and barely above the subsiste Under those primitive conditions, the level of in average income increases with economic progress, the surplus increases and the maximum possible in average income is greater. In other words, the m increasing function of mean overall income. Whe imum or allow some trickle-down is, of course, anoth both political reasons (e.g. rebellion) and econom limit their ability to extract all surplus.
It is worth measuring, however, what share of the and what share they did not. To fix ideas intuitively consists of 100 people, 99 of whom are lower class minimum is 10 units, and total income 1050 units receive 990 units of income and the only membe Gini coefficient corresponding to such a distribution w doubles over time to 2000 units, then the sole member will be able to extract 1010 units, and the correspond 49.5. If we chart the locus of such maximum possible G mean income levels on the horizontal axis, we obtain t (IPF).6 Since any progressive transfer must reduce in coefficient, we know that a less socially segmented soc Thus, IPF is indeed a frontier.
The inequality possibility frontier can be derived more f minimum, 'i = overall mean income, N = number proportion of people belonging to a (very small) uppe of upper class people (yh) will be fiN-sN(i-E) 1 » = where we assume as subsistence incomes.
Once we document population proportions and mean incomes for both classes and assume further that all members in a given class receive the same income,8 we can calculate any standard measure of inequality for the potential distribution. Here we shall derive the IPF using the Gini coefficient.9
The Gini coefficient for n social classes whose mean incomes (y) are ordered in an ascending fashion ty > y i for j > ¿), with subscripts denoting social classes, can be written as in (2)
where tt¿ = proportion of income received by ¿-th s belonging to Kh social class, G¿ = Gini inequality social class, and L = the overlap term which is greate of a lower social class (i) whose incomes exceed tho social class (j). The first term on the right-hand si (total inequality due to inequality within classes) component (total inequality due to differences in m L is, as already explained, the overlap term. Continuing with our illustrative case, where all m (upper and lower) have the mean incomes of their 5 Throughout this article, we report Ginis as percentages and t ° The IPF concept was first introduced in Milanovic (2006) .
The reader can verify this by letting one subsistence worker's in G = ^(yj-yi)pi Substituting (1) for the income of the upper class, an as well as their population shares, (3) becomes G*(n)=^-e[^-s(l-s)} where G* denotes the maximum feasible Gini coeff income (/¿) . Rearranging terms in (4) , and re-expre the subsistence minimum, [i = ots (where a > 1), yi G*(n)=^s(oL-l)=^±(l-e). (5) As the size of the elite tends towards zero (fi -> 0), that is, at the extreme when elite consists of one person only, (5) becomes G*(/i)=^l. (6) Equation (6) represents our final expression for the maximum will chart IPF as a is allowed to increase from 1 to higher va a = 1 all individuals receive the same subsistence income and when a = 2, the maximum Gini becomes 0.5 or 50%. The h generated for a values ranging between 1 and 5 is shown in F the IPF is concave, and thus the percentage change in the ma The inequality possibility frontier sharpens the definition of measures of inequality. Normally, such measures reach their extreme values when one individual appropriates the entire income (not simply all the surplus). Such extreme values are obviously just theoretical and devoid of any economic content since no society could function in such a state. That one person who appropriated the entire income would soon be all alone (everyone else having died) and after his death inequality would fall to zero and the society would cease to exist. The inequality possibility frontier avoids this irrelevance by charting maximum values of inequality compatible with the maintenance of a society (however unequal) and thus represents the maximum inequality that is sustainable in the long run. Of course, those at subsistence may revolt and overturn the elite, suggesting that the subsistence level is itself endogenous to more than just equilibrating Malthusian physiological forces.11 ' 12 3. The Data: Social Tables and Pre-Industrial Inequality Income distribution data based on large household surveys are almost never available for any pre-industrial society. The two main options for gathering fresh inequality data are to measure inequality of non-income indicators of living standards and to seek previously unused measures of income. The first option is already beginning to bear fruit. Scholars are charting the inequality of mortality and of heights. These health inequality measures are valuable in their own right, even though they do not always correlate closely with income inequality.13
This article explores the second option, the opportunity to add early data sets on the distribution of income itself. In lieu of surveys, we derive 18 of our 28 estimates of pre-industrial inequalities from what are called social tables (or, as William Petty (1690) called them more than three centuries ago, political arithmetick) where various social classes or social groups -we use the terms interchangeably -are ranked from the richest to the poorest with their estimated population shares and average incomes.14 Social tables are particularly useful in evaluating societies where classes were clearly delineated, and the differences in mean incomes between them substantial. Theoretically, if class alone determined one's income and if income differences between classes were large while income differences within classes were small, then all (or almost all) inequality would be explained by the between-class inequality (see the Gini decomposition in (2)). One of the best social table examples is offered by Gregory King's 10 For a more formal proof, see Milanovic et al (2007, Section 2) .
Note that in the special case where subsistence is zero, G* rises to the maximum value of 1 (or 100 in percentage terms). To see this, let a->oo in (5) (which is the case if s = 0) and apply L'Hospital's rule. Thus the 'usual' Gini is shown to be the special case of our maximum feasible Gini when subsistence is zero.
In the empirical analysis below, we take actual income values for all social classes, including the poorest.
The poorest class can, and in some cases will be, above the subsistence. 13 See Steckel (2009, especially pp. 13-14) and Baten (2000) , for examples. As far as we can determine, the compilers of the social tables did include income in kind produced by the consuming households themselves. Looking at the English source materials in particular, we find that Gregory King and others sought to know what different people consumed and tied their income estimates to that. In addition, the tax returns they often used for their estimates seem to include assessments of owneroccupied housing.
famous estimates for England and Wales in 168 Williamson, 1982 ). King's list of classes is fairly detai cottagers and paupers and vagrants, through farmers way to temporal lords. King (and others listed in Ta within each social class, so we cannot identify within However, within-class inequalities can be roughly ga ues: a lower bound Ginil, which estimates only the sumes wi thin-group or within-social class inequality to estimates the maximum within-class inequality compa class incomes still under the assumption that all indiv are richer than any individual from a lower social group incomes are such that ^ > yh it is also assumed that ykj where k and m are subscripts that denote individuals. inequality Gini2 includes some within-class inequality that all members of a given social class are poorer o above or below them.15 (The overlap component L f assumed to be zero.) The differences between the two Gi the lion's share of inequality is accounted for by th Table 2 ). This means that our Ginis will be fairly good (i) class-structured societies and (it) societies whose social tables are fairly detail classes. If (¿), then the overlap should be expected to be fairly small, as (say) all members of nobility are richer than all artisans, and the latter than all farmers. Similarly, when social tables are detailed (a topic we discuss below), the definitions become fairly precise, and the overlap is less. At the extreme, a social table such that each individual represents a 'social class' would make the overlap equal to zero.
Our Gini would be downward biased in cases where social tables presented only a few classes but in reality each class spanned much of the overall income spectrum. In that case, both Ginil and Gini2 would miss lots of 'overlap' inequality. However, we believe that such cases are unlikely. When authors of social tables created these tables, their interest was in the salient income cleavages they observed around them. If a society was clearly stratified, it seems likely that these observers would present estimated average incomes for only a few groups; if in contrast, a society was less stratified, it seems likely that the observers would tend to supply estimates for many more social groups (as Gregory King and Joseph Massie did for England and Wales). Thus, the number of salient social groups is likely to vary across societies, and the co-existence of a finely class-gradated society with a social table containing only a few social classes is unlikely.
For ten other societies, we use professional censuses (with provided estimates of mean income per profession), an expenditure survey and data derived from tax censuses.
15 Gini2 is routinely calculated for contemporary income distributions when the data, typically published by countries' statistical offices, are reported as fractiles of the population and their income shares. In that case, however, any member of a richer group must have a higher income than any member of a poorer group. This is unlikely to be satisfied when the fractiles are not income classes but social classes as is the case here. The Gini2 formula is due to Gastwirth (1972) and Kakwani (1980) .
C^O OOCO OÍ^OO^OiCiiCWCO r-j^ G^ J>^ r-J^ ^ ií^ 3 irT iff ^ iff cm cm co" r-T i>T -^ qT co" cm iff r-T cT c The number of social classes into which distributions a calculate our Ginis, varies considerably. They numb for 1784-99 Nueva España (comprising the territ Central America, and parts of western US). In most c in the double digits. Understandably, large numbers occupational censuses. Thus, the data from the 1 occupations. The largest number of observations Florentine (Tuscan) census where income data for almost 10,000 households are available. These large differences in the numbers of groups have little effect on the measured Ginil and Gini2 values.
The estimated inequality statistics are reported in Table 2 . The calculated Gini2s display a very wide range: from 24.5 in China 1880 to 63.5 in Nueva España 1784-99 and 63.7 in Chile 1861. The latter figure is higher than the inequality reported for some of today's most unequal countries like Brazil and South Africa. The average Gini2 16 All dollar data, unless indicated otherwise, are in 1990 Geary-Khamis PPP dollars. 17 The subsistence minimum of $PPP 300 is less than Maddison's (1998, p. 12 ) assumed subsistence minimum of $PPP 400 which, in principle, covers more than physiological needs. Note that a purely physiological minimum 'sufficient to sustain life with moderate activity and zero consumption of other goods' (Bairoch, 1993, p. 106 ) was estimated by Bairoch to be $PPP 80 at 1960 prices. Using the US consumer price index to convert Bairoch's estimate to international dollars yields $PPP 355 at 1990 prices. Our minimum is also consistent with the World Bank absolute poverty line which is 1.08 per day per capita in 1993 $PPP (Chen and Ravallion, 2007, p. 6 ). This works out to be about $PPP 365 per annum in 1990 international prices. Since more than a billion people are calculated to have incomes less than the World Bank global poverty line, it is reasonable to assume that the physiological minimum income must be less. One may recall also that Colin Clark (1957, pp. 18-23) , in his pioneering study of incomes, distinguished between international units (the early PPP dollar) and oriental units, the lower dollar equivalents which presumably hold for subtropical or tropical regions where calorie, housing and clothing needs are considerably less than in temperate climates. Since our sample includes a fair number of tropical countries, this gives us another reason to use a conservatively low estimate of the physiological minimum. 1784-99) -24.5 (China 1880) = 39 among the pre-industrial economies. In short, inequality differences within the pre-industrial and modern samples are many times greater than are differences between their averages. The Gini estimates are plotted in Figure 2 against the estimates of GDI per capita. They are also displayed against the inequality possibility frontier constructed on the assumption of a subsistence minimum of $PPP 300 (solid line). In most cases, the calculated Ginis lie fairly close to the IPF. In terms of absolute distance, the countries farthest below the IPF curve are the most 'modern' pre-industrial economies: 1561-1808 Holland and the Netherlands, 1788 France, and 1688-1801 England and Wales.
How do country inequality measures compare with the maximum feasible Ginis at their estimated income levels? Call the ratio between the actual inequality (measured by Gini2) and the maximum feasible inequality the inequality extraction ratio, indicating how much of the maximum inequality was actually extracted: the higher the inequality extraction ratio, the more (relatively) unequal the society.21 The median and mean inequality extraction ratios in our pre-industrial sample are 75.5% and 76.8%, respectively. Thus, three-quarters of maximum feasible inequality was actually 'extracted' by the top income groups in our pre-industrial sample. The countries with the lowest ratios are 1924 Java and 1811 Kingdom of Naples with extraction ratios of 48% and 54%, respectively.
19 The modern counterpart countries are defined as countries that currently cover approximately the same territory as the pre-industrial countries (e.g., Turkey for Byzantium, Italy for Rome, Mexico for Nueva España, modern Japan for pre-industrial Japan, and so on).
20 The hypothesis of equality of the two means is accepted (t-test significant at 16% only). 21 The term 'relative' is used here, faute de mieux, to denote conventionally calculated inequality in relation to maximum possible inequality at a given level of income, not whether the measure of inequality itself is relative or absolute. 
(an extraction ratio of 106%
extraction ratio of almost exactly ferent powers. These violations of t be due to measurement errors or m live below subsistence temporarily. mis-measuring national product pe wrong (too high) subsistence to the Nueva España, a portion of the po hunger, exhaustion due to force shelter. Poor people's income ofte below the minimum and they surv same individuals cannot, by definiti the only two societies in our sam
Moghul India and 1790 Nueva Españ with this explanation.
22 The measurement error is made more likel each calculated with significant amount of u of mean income.
The observations for England and Wales, and H countries for which we have at least three pre-indust highlight their historical evolution of inequality re Between 1290 and 1688, and particularly between increase of the Gini in England and Wales was signif IPF. The English inequality extraction ratio dropped in 1688 and to about 55% in 1759. However, betw happened: the extraction ratio rose to almost 61%. between 1732 and 1808. As average income decrease too did inequality but the latter even more so. Thu from around 72% to 68%.
The inequality possibility frontier allows us to situate these pre-modern inequality estimates better in the modern experience. Using the same framework that we have just applied to earlier societies, the bottom panel of Table 2 provides estimates of inequality extraction ratios for 25 contemporary societies. Brazil and South Africa have often been cited as examples of extremely unequal societies. Indeed, both countries display Ginis comparable to those of the most unequal pre-industrial societies. But
Brazil and South Africa are several times richer than the richest pre-industrial society in our sample, so that the maximum feasible inequality is much higher than anything we have seen in our pre-industrial countries sample. Thus, the top income groups in both countries have extracted only a little more than 60% of their countries' maximum inequality and their inequality extraction ratios are about the same as what we found among the less exploitative pre-industrial societies (1801-3 England and Wales, and 1886 Japan).
In the year 2000, countries near the world median GDI per capita (about $PPP 3500) or near the world mean population-weighted GDI per capita (a little over $PPP 6000), had maximum feasible Ginis of 91 and 95 respectively. The median Gini in today's world is about 35. Thus a 'representative' country has extracted just a bit less than 40% of feasible inequality, vastly less than did pre-industrial societies. For the modern counterparts of our pre-industrial societies, the ratio is 44% (Table 2 ). China's present inequality extraction ratio is almost 46%, while that for the US is near 40% and that for Sweden is less than 28%. Only in the extremely poor countries today, with GDI per capita less than $PPP 600, do actual and maximum feasible Ginis lie close together (2004 Congo Democratic Republic, and 2000 Tanzania) .23 Compared with the maximum inequality possible, today's inequality is much smaller than that of pre-industrial societies.
It could be argued that our new inequality extraction ratio measure reflects societal inequality, and the role it plays, more accurately than any actual inequality measure. For example, Tanzania (denoted TZA in Figure 3 ) with a relatively low Gini of about 35 may be less egalitarian than it appears since measured inequality lies fairly close to its inequality possibility frontier (Table 2 and Figure 3 ). On the other hand, with a much higher Gini of almost 48, Malaysia (MYS) has extracted only about one-half of maximum inequality and thus is farther away from the IPF. This new view of inequality Another implication of our approach is that it considers inequality and developmen jointly. As a country becomes richer, its feasible inequality expands. Consequently, eve if recorded inequality is stable, the inequality extraction ratio must fall; and even recorded inequality goes up, the extraction ratio may not. This can be seen in Figure   where we plot the inequality extraction ratio against GDI per capita for both pre-industrial societies and their modern counterparts. Economic development offers this positive message: the inequality extraction ratio will fall with GDI per capita growth even if measured inequality remains constant. However, economic decline offers th opposite message: a decline in GDI per capita, like that registered by Russia in the earl stages of its transition from communism, drives the country's maximum feasible inequality down. If the measured Gini had been stable, the inequality extraction ratio would have risen. If the measured Gini rose (as was indeed the case in Russia), the inequality extraction ratio would have risen even more sharply. Rising inequality may be particularly socially disruptive under these conditions.
Conclusions
Our exploration of pre-industrial history has uncovered two key aspects of inequality. First, income inequality in pre-industr inequality in distant pre-industrial tim among countries then and now is simila difference in average inequality betwee dispersion and the mean of inequality st and today, are similar. Second, the extraction ratio -how muc actual inequality -was significantly bigg more can be learned about inequality in extraction ratio rather than just at act perspective on how powerful, repressiv institutions and policies. In growing ec
Gini or Theil-measured inequality inc measured inequality translates into grea thus reach again the conclusion about t social stability.
24 However, it seems likely that any measure of inequality used here) would confirm that past pr industrial inequalities. There has been an immense even poor countries since the First Industrial Rev directed towards cleaner cities and public health. 
